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War, Peace and Love by Emmanuel Lévinas
The possibility of peace – phenomenology of warfare violence
Emmanuel Lévinas is now widely recognized as one of the most important 
Continental philosophers of the twentieth century. His abiding concern was 
the primacy of the ethical relation to the other person and his central thesis 
was that ethics is first philosophy. His work has had a profound impact on 
a number of fields outside philosophy, such as theology, Jewish studies, liter-
ature and cultural theory, psychotherapy, sociology, political theory, interna-
tional relations theory and critical legal theory. Emmanuel Lévinas is known 
as the author of many books, including “Totality and Infinity”, (1961) and 
“Otherwise than being or beyond essence” (1981). In the first book a think-
er is presenting still the same subject, his words refer to the dialogic style 
that respects both sides of the relationship, and freedom, on which it will 
have no the place later. The next book takes up the idea of human subjectiv-
ity sensu stricto. Philosopher presents them in close connection with every-
day, yet extraordinary event of responsibility for another human being, to the 
substitution, or else made the ultimate sacrifice of their lives. His thinking 
is an interpretive, phenomenological description of the rise and repetition 
of the face-to-face encounter, or the intersubjective relation at its precogni-
tive core, being called by another and responding to that other. If precogni-
tive experience, that is, human sensibility, can be characterized conceptual-
ly, then it must be described in what is most characteristic to it: a continuum 
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of sensibility and affectivity, in other words, sentience and emotion in their 
interconnection. Levinas’s assertion of the transcendence of the face should 
be understood as the most telling point of departure among the thinkers of 
instrumental reason of today.
No serious reader can be spared by the shock generated by the provocative 
declaration of Lévinas at the very beginning of his book Totalité et Infini, in 
which he stigmatizes the realm of being as the state of war: war is produced 
as the pure experience of pure being, nothing henceforth is exterior. War does 
not manifest exteriority and the other as other; it destroys the identity of the 
same. The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of 
totality, which dominates Western philosophy.”1 This statement, however, is 
implementing a simplification in the world of mental situation. Lévinas’ read-
ing of the history of Western philosophy is wrong, Jacques Derrida argues, 
reality is never as black as depicted by him.2 Needless to say, the subsequent 
development of human history shows amply that Kant’s project of eternal 
peace remains a pious hope. Lévinas, who himself has witnessed both world 
wars of the 20th Century and was a prisoner of war in a German concentra-
tion camp during five long years in the Second World War, has certainly the 
right to express his disappointment and the authority to cast his doubt on 
the feasibility of a project of peace basing on the concept of enlightenment 
by the mere means of knowledge. “That history of a peace, a freedom and 
well-being promised on the basis of a light that a universal knowledge pro-
jected on the world and human society… that history is not recognizable in 
its millennia of fratricidal struggles, political or bloody, of imperialism, scorn 
and exploitation of the human being, down to our century of world wars, the 
genocides of the Holocaust and terrorism; unemployment and continual des-
perate poverty of the Third World; ruthless doctrines and cruelty of fascism 
and national socialism, right down to the supreme paradox of the defense of 
man and his rights being perverted into Stalinism,”3 So, Lévinas also wrote: 
“Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the oth-
er to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the 
comprehension of being… To know ontologically is to surprise in a confront-
ed existent that by which it is not this existent, this very stranger, but that by 
1 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totalité et Infini, Essai sur l’extériorité, The Hague 1961, 
pp. IX-X.
2 Jacques Derrida, Violence et métaphysique, essai sur la pensée d’ Emmanel Lévi-
nas, in: L’écriture et la différence, Paris 1967, p. 122.
3 E. Lévinas, Paix et proximité, in: E. Lévinas, Les Cahiers de la nuit surveillée 
No. 3, Éditions Verdier, Paris 1984), p. 340; eng. transl. as Peace and proximity, in: 
Alterity and Transcendence, eng. transl. Michael B. Smith, New York 1999, p. 132.
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which it is somehow betrayed, surrenders, is given in the horizon in which 
it loses itself and appears, lays itself open to grasp, becomes a concept.”4 By 
means of the concept, philosophy keeps jealously her freedom to search for 
truth. Keeping her freedom means keeping her own identity, in spite of the 
impenetrable strangers which bar her road to sovereign Truth. “Perceived in 
this way, philosophy would be engaged in reducing to the same all that is op-
posed to it as other. It would be moving toward auto-nomy, a stage in which 
nothing irreducible would limit thought any longer, in which, consequently, 
thought, not-limited, would be free. Philosophy would thus be tantamount 
to the conquest of being by man over the course of history.”5 Thus for Lévi-
nas, Western philosophy is a thinking of totalization:6 it has the character-
istics of absorbing all elements of alterity in the immanence of the same. It 
continues to exercise the violence upon all Other as Other in the conquest of 
Being. When the Other can only be grasped as an object of knowledge, she is 
only a generic existence, she loses forever her unicity and irreducible alteri-
ty. She is always the same, and she can never be the different Other. Philos-
ophy of totalization is totalitarian philosophy.
Emmanuel Lévinas is attentive to the two versions of phenomenological 
ontology represented by Hegel and Heidegger. To Lévinas, both Hegelian and 
Heideggerian ontologies are philosophies of totalization.7 Lévinas summariz-
es the dark heritage of Hegelian ontology in the follow terms: “Since Hegel, 
we are accustomed to thinking that philosophy exceeds the framework of an-
thropology. The ontological event accomplished by philosophy consists in sup-
pressing or transmuting the alterity of all that is Other, in universalizing the 
immanence of the Same (le Même) or of Freedom, in effacing the boundaries, 
and in expelling the violence of Being (Être).”8 Reducing the Other to the Same, 
4 E. Lévinas, Totalité et Infini, pp. 13-14.
5 E. Lévinas, La philosophie et l’idée de l’Infini, in: En découvrant l’existence avec Hus-
serl et Heidegger, 3rd ed., Paris 1974, p. 166.
6 Cfr. Lévinas’ acticle Totalité et totalisation, originally a contribution to the Ency-
clopaedia Universalis, Paris 1968, now in: Altérité et Transcendance (Saint-Clément 
1995); eng. transl. as Totality and Totalization, in: Alterity and Transcendence, pp. 39-51.
7 E. Lévinas, Transcendance et hauteur, in: Liberté et commandement, Saint-Clé-
ment 1994; Le Livre de poche, Biblio Essais No. 4240, Paris 1999, p. 61.
8 E. Lévinas refers to Rosenzweig’s Stern der Erlösung in the Preface to Totalité et 
Infini (p. XVI; Totality and Infinity, p. 28) and other interviews, e.g. in Philosophie, jus-
tice, amour, in: Entre nous. Essais sur le penser-à-l’autre, Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, 
Paris 1991. Lévinas has contributed a philosophical essay to Rosenzweig in the Pref-
ace (pp. 7-16) to a study written in French by Stéphane Mosès, Système et revelation. 
La philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig, Paris 1982. S. Mosès has also published a small 
volume on Lévinas: Au-delà de la guerre. Trois études sur Lévinas, Paris-Tel Aviv 2004.
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suppressing all boundaries within the realm of being to create a vast space of 
homogeneity: the final form of Hegelian ontology as System of Science and 
Absolute knowledge is justification of generalized violence by the elegant cos-
tume of speculative dialectics. The history of humanity, throughout religions, 
civilizations, states, wars and revolutions, is nothing but this penetration, or 
this revelation, of reason within Being, long before the philosopher’s thought 
has become aware of it in formulating the System.”9 In the all-embracing He-
gelian system, every single event loses its specificity, every human individual 
is alienated from the singularity of its fate. On this system, in its function to 
realize the freedom and autonomy of the Spirit, the State is a greater individ-
uality than the single person. Thus for the sake of the State, the life and prop-
erty of individual persons should be sacrificed. So, war is a necessary means 
to this end. Lévinas does not have more tender words towards the ontologi-
cal philosophy expressed in “Sein und Zeit” by Martin Heidegger, which he 
qualifies as “philosophy of power” and “philosophy of injustice”.10 The author 
of Totalité et Infini thinks that when Heideggerian ontology subordinates all 
relation with beings (Seiendes as individuals) under the relation with Being 
(Sein), “it affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics”.11 It is in fact a tyran-
ny, Levinas writes, just as the system in Hegelian ontology.12 Thus freedom is 
not that of the individual; on the contrary, freedom emerges only as the re-
sult of obedience to Being. Thus the ontological thematization and concep-
tualization in “Sein und Zeit” is “not peace with the other but suppression or 
possession of the other.”13 The Heideggerian Dasein always relates to other as 
shown in its structure of “being-with” (Mitsein). But this is true only in the 
everyday inauthentic state. The situation of the authentic Dasein is solitude. 
In Dasein’s totalizing potentiality of being, the Other disappears. The authen-
tic Dasein can relate to is nothing other than its/her ownness. Not only the 
authentic Dasein cannot consider the death of other Dasein, for Heidegger it 
simply makes no sense to talk about the death of the other Dasein. It is clear 
that in the eyes of Lévinas Heidegger opts for the former – the Same which 
is always his own authenticity – and declines in advance, like a disclaimer, 
any responsibility towards the Other. Thus Heideggerian ontology ends up 
9 E. Lévinas, Hegel et les Juifs, in: Difficile liberté. Essais sur le judaïsme, 2nd ed., 
Paris 1976; eng. transl. as Hegel and the Jews, in: Difficult Freedom. Essays on Juda-
ism, eng. transl. S. Hand, London 1990, p. 235.
10 E. Lévinas, Totalité et Infini, pp. 16-17.
11 Ibidem, p. 16.
12 Ibidem, p. 17.
13 Ibidem, p. 16.
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“affirming a tradition in which the same dominates the other, in which free-
dom… precedes justice.” Worst, “it thus continues to exalt the will to power, 
whose legitimacy the other alone can unsettle, troubling good conscience.”14
Humanity needs and merits peace! Such is Lévinas’ pathetic cry. How is 
peace possible? Exit from totality, transcendence towards the Other! How to 
rejoin the Other after two thousand years of domination of philosophies of 
identity? Lévinas urges us to inverse the tendency: listen to the call of peace 
prior to the call of truth. In the practice of philosophy, that means wisdom at 
the service of love instead of love at the service of wisdom.15 To Lévinas, it all 
depends on how we understand dialogue and discussion. In opposition to the 
‘interiority’ of sly passions and the secret perfidy of subjective opinions, Rea-
son would be the true inner life. Reason is one. It has no one left with whom 
to communicate; nothing is outside of it. And consequently, Reason is like the 
silence of inner discourse, Lévinas said. The concept of dialogue in question 
is an old one, one basing on the Enlightenment model of unitary Reason. It is 
a predominantly cognitivist or intellectualist model of sovereign Reason. It ig-
nores the fact that each subject entering into dialogue is an absolutely unfath-
omable subjectivity. It is ignorant of what Husserl has shown in the 5th Carte-
sian Meditations: that we can never have intuitive presentation of the psychic 
life of the Other, because the latter is always at the exterior of our own sphere 
of immanence. We can only imagine our entering into the soul of the Other 
by appresentation, which is presentation in an analogical sense. We never 
know how two phantoms embrace each other when they greet one another. 
We are never sure whether we can touch the heart of the person we hug or 
kiss, if this very act of hugging or kissing is just a convention of reciprocal po-
liteness. The ethics of discussion tries to obtain peace among interlocutors by 
suppressing the difference and the alterity of the speaking subjects. Consensus 
is obtained by virtue of the unification of the voices of the multiple. We must 
ask ourselves whether the dynamism and exaltation of peace by truth derives 
uniquely from the suppression of alterity and not just as much from the very 
possibility of the Encounter with the other as other…, for which a common 
truth is the pretext.”16 To say, we must go back to the field where war actually 
takes place and observe how the stopping of hostility is brought about. Only 
through this specific backward questioning is it possible to understand how 
peace is possible. In Lévinas’ terms, this is the question of how the domain of 
14 E. Lévinas, La philosophie et l’idée de l’Infini, p. 171; Philosophy and the Idea 
of Infinity, p. 53.
15 E. Lévinas, Paix et proximité, p. 342; Peace and proximity, pp.136-137.
16 E. Lévinas, Le dialogue…, op. cit., p. 217.
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totality can be broken such that human beings no longer exist simply as ge-
neric being but also as individuals with flesh and bone, and thus can relate to 
the Other as Other. If in a war, a human being is just like a pure object under 
mechanical control, we cannot see how it is possible to create a crack with-
in this domain of totality. What is paradoxical about warfare is that in actu-
al fact, war is far from simply an immanent domain of totality, precisely be-
cause the individuals who take part in the war refuse to be simply an object of 
mathematical calculation or mechanical manipulation. And this is because it 
is a question of life and death. On the battlefield, no one is sure that he will be 
on the side of victory. In order to save their own life, soldiers in an army fac-
ing defeat will choose to surrender or even to defect. In this case, they refuse 
to be part of the original community. In choosing defection, they even trans-
gress the law. By these acts, they exit from the totality! This is the first possibil-
ity of transcendence. All this is described by Lévinas in terms: “War therefore 
is to be distinguished from the logical opposition of the one and the other by 
which both are defined within a totality open to a panoramic view, to which 
they would owe their very opposition. In war beings refuse to belong to a total-
ity, refuse community, Lévinas is writing, they refuse law; no frontier stops one 
being by another, nor defines them. They affirm themselves as transcending 
the totality, each identifying itself not by its place in the whole, but by its self.”17
Since in war no one is sure of victory in advance, tactics and strategies are 
important. Thus war is never a pure being of totality. There is fissure inher-
ent in it, from where rupture and exit is possible. That is why transcendence 
is possible. In war the adversaries seek out one another.”18 The further prob-
lem is here: what kind of relation do two antagonistic soldiers entertain with 
one another? They are two individuals seeking out one another in order to kill 
the other. They are engaged in a relation of mortal confrontation. So it is their 
very mortality which relates them together. As a soldier, my mortality is relat-
ed to the Other. This is the first point of difference of Lévinas’s understanding 
of death in contrast to Heidegger: in “Sein und Zeit”, my death has nothing to 
do with other Dasein, and the death of other Dasein does not concern me. The 
soldier is animated by the will to kill. But at the same time he risks being killed. 
If he succeeds in killing the first enemy he sees, he is not sure whether he will 
not be killed in subsequent confrontations. Thus if a soldier is still in life, it 
is simply the postponement of his death. So the being of a soldier is “a being 
postponing his death”.19 As a soldier, as far as I am still in life and able to kill, 
17 E. Lévinas, Totalité et Infini, pp. 197-198.
18 Ibidem, p. 198.
19 Ibidem, p. 200.
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I enjoy freedom. But I am still in life only because I am postponing my death. 
It is the Other who sustains my freedom by granting me the reprieve of not 
yet killed, so my freedom depends on the Other. Here what the phenomenon 
of warfare violence shows is a paradoxical concept of freedom: my freedom 
depends on the Other. There is neither absolute nor unilateral freedom, free-
dom and dependence are like the two sides of the same coin. In granting me 
freedom, the Other also grants me the possibility of transcendence. “A tran-
scendence of the Other with regard to me which, being finite, does not have 
the same signification as my transcendence with regard to him, Lévinas said. 
The risk that war involves measures the distance that separates bodies with-
in their hand-to-hand struggle (les corps dans leur corps-à-corps). The Other, 
in the hands of forces that weaken him, exposed to powers, remains unfore-
seeable, that is, transcendent.”20 The phenomenon of warfare violence shows 
that my mortality, my freedom and my transcendence, which enable me to 
exit totality, all depend on the Other. That is why I owe my temporary surviv-
al to my enemy. This is the debt I owe him. My responsibility then consists in 
repaying this debt. That is why this relation of the first order is an ethical re-
lation: because I owe to the Other my possibility of freedom and transcend-
ence, my relation with him is asymmetrical.21
Freedom and transcendence break totality, they open up the space of peace. 
My anguish comes from seeing the face of the Other. Since the Other as tran-
scendence is at the origin of my freedom and transcendence, and since my 
relation to the Other is a relation of debt, on seeing the vulnerability of the 
face of the Other, I have to respond to my debt I owe him. I cannot help from 
saying to myself: “Thou shalt not kill!” The force of the Other is already and 
henceforth moral.”22 In Lévinas’s phenomenology of warfare violence, there 
is possibility of exteriority and transcendence; individuals can enjoy freedom, 
even if this freedom is never total. Yet it is a game of fifty-fifty in which no one 
is sure of winning in advance. Precisely because war is a form of undecided vi-
olence which renders possible freedom, transcendence and relation between 
individuals. It is even a question of life and death between human individu-
als. However, the above sketch remains incomplete in terms of the search for 
peace. Because the stop of hostility between the belligerent parties does not 
mean total peace, not to say perpetual peace. What the phenomenon of war-
fare violence succeeds in showing is: the transcendence of the Other is a key to 
peace. This have to be completed by a phenomenology of love, for love is the 
20 Ibidem, pp. 200-201.




movement of transcendence towards the Other as Other. Love is simply the 
desire of the Other. In “Totalité et Infini”, the phenomenology of war is con-
tinued by the phenomenology of Eros and fecundity. Love is blind, for there 
is no concept. There is not a fix structure of subject and object. In a love af-
fair, the lovers are engaged in a game which advances towards infinity. Love 
as Eros is rather the affair between two persons, which is extremely complex 
and paradoxical. Lévinas gives patient and detailed descriptions of the phe-
nomenon of erotic nudity which involves the moments of modesty (pudeur), 
profanation, caress and voluptuous pleasure or voluptuosity (volupté). In the 
case of voluptuosity, it is a game of hidden desire, of going beyond the person-
al while the personal never completely submerges. It is an experience of quasi 
death. Lévinas has vivid descriptions of the metaphysical character of erotic 
love: “It disrupts the relation of the I with itself and with the non-I. An amor-
phous non-I sweeps away the I into an absolute future where it escapes itself 
and loses its position as a subject. Its ‘intention’ no longer goes forth unto the 
light, unto the meaningful. Wholly passion, it is compassion for the passivity, 
the suffering, the evanescence of the tender. It dies with this death and suffers 
with this suffering.”23 In short, a subject in love loses her sovereignty as a sub-
ject. She loses her freedom and becomes passive. The descriptions of erotic 
love show that love is neither friendship, as it is not something among sev-
eral persons or within a community but rather an affair of extreme intimacy 
between two persons. Nor is love the possession of the soul of the Other, be-
cause the two consciousnesses are not united to form a single consciousness. 
Since the union passes by voluptuous pleasure, so love is not an intellectual 
and reflective relation but as such immediate and passive. In a love affair, I ex-
pect the one I love to love me, so this is a reciprocal relation. But the loving 
relation is not merely reciprocal, because I am moving towards an Other, to 
the profound depth of an alterity. In short, love is a movement of transcend-
ence, a relation with the Other who is entirely at the exteriority. “Love does 
not transcend unequivocably-it is complacent, it is pleasure and egoism be-
tween the two. But in this complacence it equally moves away from itself; it 
abides in a vertigo above a depth of alterity that no signification clarifies any 
longer.”24 Yet as movement of transcendence, love is not satisfied with the pre-
sent, it projects towards the future. This is shown by the phenomenon of fe-
cundity: giving birth to a new generation. Giving birth to a child brings about 
a new relation with the Other, a relation of absolute future, of infinite time. 
“This future is neither the Aristotelian germ (less than being, a lesser being) 
23 Ibidem, p. 237.
24 Ibidem, p. 244.
|41
Lingua ac Communitas | ISSN 1230-3143| Vol. 22 | 2012 | 33-58
nor the Heideggerian possibility which constitutes being itself, but transforms 
the relation with the future into a power of the subject.”25 It is because a child, 
my child, is at the same time “my own and not-mine, a possibility of myself 
but also a possibility of the other, of the Beloved – my future does not enter 
into the logical essence of the possible.”26 As parents, we get older, but we do 
not need to abandon ourselves. On the contrary, with the new generation, fe-
cundity is the continuation of history. The coming of a child, I am able to tran-
scend the world by renewing my substance by someone who is at the same 
time the Same and the Other. Lévinas summarizes his conception of peace 
in the following terms: “Peace therefore cannot be identified with the end of 
combats that cease for want of combatants, by the defeat of some and the vic-
tory of the others, that is, with cemeteries of future universal empires. Peace 
must be my peace, in a relation that starts from an I and goes to the other, in 
desire and goodness, where the I both maintains itself and exists without ego-
ism. It is conceived starting from an I assured of the convergence of morali-
ty and reality, that is, of an infinite time which through fecundity is its time.”27 
In short, through love, Eros and fecundity, the movement of transcendence 
towards alterity projects onto an infinite time, then peace is possible.
The moral awakening and acceptance of your own responsibility
The pope Benedict XVI warns against ‘rule of reason’. In the German par-
liament (Bundestag) the pope has said that the final standard (measure) and 
the reason for the work of a politician should not be successful and certainly 
not material gain. The policy must be efforts to bring about justice and thus 
create the prerequisite for peace. As people of conscience we do over our fate 
continuously, for the good of our world. So, for instance, listen to Chopin. 
Take long walks. Ask yourself what you did now. Do that every night. Before 
you go to sleep, ask yourself if the world is better because of you. After all, it’s 
your world. You are the world. So, take responsibility for your actions. Some-
one once said, “Excuses won’t lift your butt?” Listen to that. Believe that with 
all your heart. “Plus ratio quam vis.” Confess something about yourself to 
a friend-something awful, something you’d never want anyone to know. You’ll 
feel better. You’ll still see that you’re worthy of love. And since your friend is 
you, you are really just telling yourself. Have an interest in everything. Thirst 
25 Ibidem, p. 244.
26 Ibidem.
27 Ibidem, p. 283.
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for knowledge. Remember that it’s all about you. When you learn about other 
thing, you are actually learning about yourself. Get to know you better. Now, 
your behaviour is worthy of praise. You face me, I am the one who, while en-
joying my life in the world, am summoned to make place for you. By address-
ing me, you are the first who shows me the meaning of a human face. You 
open the dimension of ethics by the command that targets me when you look 
at me or speak to me. Independently of all your wishes and motivations, by 
simply being yourself, but against the ego-centered intentions of my enjoy-
ment, you offer me a meaning for my life, which, thereby, is revealed as being 
more and different than a possibility of enjoying everything that comes my 
way. The meaning you impose on me lies in my devotion to you, my respon-
sibility for you, not only for your future, but also for your past and presence 
with all the right and wrong they contain. I can become a saint by carrying 
your burdens with you. By serving you, I will at the same time accomplish, as 
far as I can, my own destiny…But the Other is described in our work. I ap-
pear to myself otherwise than others appear to me: I do not look at myself 
and I do not speak to myself as if I were two persons at the same time, but, in 
a certain, further to be determined sense, I too am an Other for myself. If it 
is at all possible to experience myself as somehow commanding, summoning, 
or obligating me, this experience of my own otherness must be described in 
a simultaneously different and analogically similar way. Other is me! For you 
(the Other) also are needy, my responsibility for you includes your enjoyable 
use of worldly goods for making you good and happy. Your enjoyment of the 
earth and its elements is a purpose, and thus a part, of my dedication to you; 
even if I must sacrifice my pleasures to your well-being, such devotion be-
longs to the accomplishment of both your and my own destiny…The Other, 
Autrui, is you who, by facing me, awaken me to my incessant responsibility for 
you. This responsibility does not stop at feeding, clothing, healing, and pro-
tecting you against dangers. Your humanization demands education and civ-
ilization. It also includes my responsibility for your moral growth, which in-
cludes your moral awakening and your acceptance of your own responsibility. 
Within the limits that your singular destiny and your freedom impose on me, 
I am responsible for your responsibility. I awaken and encourage you, and 
cooperate with your taking responsibility for other Others: him, her, them, 
and… me! Your being responsible for me confirms what I said above it links 
you and me by a double bond, which is stronger than any unilateral devotion. 
Mutual and generous (‘asymmetric’) responsibility, implied in the meeting of 
your and my own «heights», is essential for the universal responsibility that 
regards not only you, but all those others who may become and are already 
waiting for being linked to you or me: he, she, they and all of them.
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When Emmanuel Lévinas insists on my responsibility for the entire hu-
manity, this seeming exaggeration is a consequence of the fact that every hu-
man individual has a face and that the unicity of each potential you is as ab-
solute as that of you who face me here and now. The problem that emerges 
from the multiplicity of yous that obligate me, is that it seems to annul the 
infinity of your command and my total dedication: how could I be as com-
pletely and endlessly responsible for all possible or virtual yous as I am for 
you who here and now regard me? Will my being-for-you then not be scat-
tered into minimal and irrelevant portions of service to innumerable yous? 
It is certainly important to prevent your unicity and my own from drowning 
in the anonymous mass of a totalizing realm. Each individual’s destiny is so 
radically different from each other’s that no You or I can ever be reduced to 
a mere component of some higher, all-encompassing union or communal 
unity. Insofar as You or I are merely parts of a supra-individual or infra-sin-
gular reality, we are no longer You and I, but instances of one and the same 
universal that only allows for variations. In the strong sense of You-as-high, 
you correlate with me, your servant, who find myself dedicated to you de-
spite myself (malgré-moi). I discover my self as ethically situated and deter-
mined by your existence.28 But there are other figures of the Other in think-
ers’ work, and, since each figure of the Other induces a corresponding figure 
of Me, there are as many configurations of «the I». Within the horizons of the 
egocentric economy, my dwelling in the world would be cold and certain bar-
ren without intimacy with a feminine other, who creates the homely climate 
of a house. Phenomenology of dwelling shows that being at home (chez soi) 
in the world demands more than material protection. It also includes a hu-
man and humane companionship. When written by a man, such a phenom-
enology will easily evoke the feminine tenderness of someone who, as such, 
veils and mitigates the rigor of persistent demands and commands by show-
ing the welcoming warmth of ongoing hospitality. Thinker emphasized that 
the «feminine» component of «homeliness» can also be represented by men.
Love opens a dimension that is neither merely needy, nor already ethical. 
It shapes a person, happens, it becomes a miracle of creation, but there is like 
new a beginning of something great only in the relay of generations. Here I am 
not yet confronted with my ethical destiny. Being at home in the world and 
belonging to a history of love and procreation condition my self-appropria-
tion and the realization of my destiny, but they do not yet show the ultimate 
28 Dear reader may have already noticed one distinction here, between the subject – 
as a subject, showing the anthropological nature of man and subject – as a self describ-
ing its site more psychological, author’s emphasis.
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meaning of human lives. The life always limited but real, degree fulfilled or 
to live, like Moses, for a history that goes on after one’s death. The «infinition» 
of a mortal life that is relived in others, history as messianic endeavor and ex-
pectation, is that the final hope that emerges from obedience to the unchosen 
but embraced election that consumes our lives? Is this the final meaning of 
«the I», of Me who find myself subjected to each and all of those who come 
my way? I suppose even the greatest uncertainty about the meaning of histo-
ry cannot destroy my substitution for the Other(s). I like You. I myself. De-
sire, Needs, You, He/She/They, the beloved Companion, the Father, and the 
Son, all of these reveal correlated figurations of Me. I am a multitude of fig-
ures, while maintaining one unique happiness. How can these figurations of 
my self compose one singular individuality? The main tension, or rather, the 
real struggle, that seems to split me in two different orientations is caused by 
the opposition between the Desire of the Absolute that draws me out of my-
self, on the one hand, and the needs that imprison me in a hedonic «interi-
ority», on the other. Both orientations are constitutive of my existence, but 
they seem to exclude a synthesis. What I must learn and perform is a true 
or a conversion from my being steeped in narcissism to complete devotion. 
I must give my bread to the hungry, my energy to those who need help, my 
thoughts to the child that needs education. I must spend my life and work 
for the survival of the wounded, the liberation of the persecuted, and the sal-
vation of the abused. But giving my life for others implies that I die and my 
needs with it. Are we summoned to sacrifice ourselves and to become saints 
like the Servant of the Lord? Must I hate my own life in order to be devoted? 
Insofar as human existence participates in being-as-intéressement, it is es-
sentially egoistic. A thinker evokes a primordial level or dimension of being 
that precedes the interested endeavour of life. The «be-ing» of «there was» or 
«there is» must be characterized as the opposite of any giving or granting, as 
another thinker would have it when he evokes being’s generosity through the 
German formula ‘es gibt’. Thinker describes our being steeped in the unlimit-
ed and indefinable kind of being evoked by a burden from which we cannot 
escape, a meaningless charge that weighs on me and resists my liberation. It 
makes me guilty and accusable before I have had any chance to position my-
self with regard to the existence of the world, humanity, or myself. Its imper-
sonal and wholly indeterminate obscurity is what weighs me down and makes 
me guilty by association. For it is only by awakening to faces that light and 
goodness are revealed to me, so that my existence may discover a meaning 
and a destiny. Being itself is driven by a tendency that prefigures the volun-
tary preference for my own interest over yours. But the Good itself, as «uncon-
taminated by being», is generous. If my self-interested effort, my enjoyment, 
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as participation in the all-encompassing intéressement of being, constituted 
my happiness, I would never be able to be completely dedicated to the Other, 
completely «yours». Not only would I then never be able to perform the in-
finite task of serving you, but I must then continually «expiate» the self-pref-
erence that I cannot stop performing. If I cannot put an end to my self-enjoy-
ment, because I am imprisoned in my egoism, I am and remain necessarily 
guilty and stand rightly «accused» of not taking my being-for-you seriously 
enough. My guilt is aggravated if my obligations do not only signify my re-
sponsibility for your well-being, but also, more radically, my incessant sub-
stitution for you. As such, I am guilty of your guilt and responsible for your 
responsibility, liable for your misdeeds and the entirety of your life, like «the 
servant of the Lord».
My life is meaningful
I am responsible for you, so I cannot and should not take away your lib-
erty, does not mean that my life can replace the entirety of your life, because 
this would erase your freedom and your own responsibility. Nor can I bur-
den you with the entirety of my words, deeds, and thoughts. My life is then 
not empty but meaningful. as I live for you, I realize what I am supposed to 
realize as being always already dedicated to you, even if the ensuing empty-
ing exhausts me. If I die because I let you eat my bread, I cannot indulge in 
materiality of life and neglect the interestedness of my needs; but does the 
realization of an utterly dedicated – and thus meaningful – life exclude all 
kinds of joy, contentment, delight, or jubilation? No! Even suffering can be 
undergone without destroying the experience of a certain joy that accom-
panies devotion. It is often necessary to accept pain, suffering, and death for 
you. A different point of view on your and my survival can arise from scar-
city. But always «I am happy about your success.» «I enjoy our conversation 
and your enjoying it». «I intensely desire that your best desires be fulfilled, 
even if it costs me a lot». «I am happy because you are happy and I would 
not be happy if you were not». However, if it is possible to show that my ser-
vice and responsibility for your true interest does not exclude but includes 
the realization of my own life’s true interest, then my being-for-you does not 
destroy, but, on the contrary, fosters the main task of my life and the fulfill-
ment of my destiny. This would not exempt me from sacrificing certain kinds 
of interest, not even from suffering and dying in your place, but it would in-
tegrate these sacrifices into the decisive meaning of my own life as much as 
yours. Now a thinker says: I am respectable. If I with you am responsible not 
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only for your corporeal well-being, but also for the orientation and quality 
of your entire life, this presupposes in me the necessary conditions for such 
a huge task: benevolence, freedom of action, some wisdom about human des-
tiny, a certain degree of prudence, acquaintance with a good tradition, and so 
on. In the love of neighbor, conatus seems to disappear, for to love a neighbor 
is “always put in question … power.”29 But this love which goes to the substi-
tution, sacrifice, he does not hire the Other par excellence? Is there not here 
as a movement of the immanentisation of transcendence itself? Yet Lévi-
nas speaks a “word of God” which “must precede the revelation in positive 
religions.”30 Confusion, again: what is it, this word of God? “Commandment 
incredible”, or “proclamation of a right”? Revelation, or affirmation of a natu-
ral privilege? I’m certainly still second, but it is no longer present on the mode 
of sonship, but on that of the “after-you”! Between the word of God and the 
creature (me): a man! Any move to this by the third party, by the intermedi-
ary. The law, in place of the father, my brother installs. But to accept respon-
sibility for your life would be irresponsible if I cannot bear responsibility for 
myself. But how, through which experiences, do I discover my responsibility 
for my own life? How do I awaken to the respectability of my own, non-cho-
sen but amazing and amazingly worthy existence? How do I become aware 
of the «height» of that in me, which orders me «to take good care of myself»? 
To follow my conscience presupposes that I discover what calls me through 
it. The substantial or «hypostatic» core of my life precedes my acceptance of 
the responsibility to which my given self trusts the unfolding of my possibil-
ities. The conscientious realization of my own self is a service that I desire to 
perform in order to honor the conscience that targets me. On the elementary 
level of life, my happiness is confirmed and unfolded by an enjoyable trans-
formation of the earth into my home, but the deepest, originary interest or 
Desire in me is the most disinterested, unselfish, and un-egoistic of all inter-
ests. Lévinas said: if we are not motivated by this «Desire of the Absolute,» 
neither my own, nor any other self could inspire any interest in the Good be-
yond being. Then I think being the result of any kind of cognition, the self ’s 
responsibility to the other who faces is immediate, originary, and irreducible.
Now, You looked at me, his (your) face pained. “Let’s wait outside,” I said. 
And luck was with us. Probably yet not an interesting life but only the tribula-
tion is gaining on the cosmos. For this reason at last time it would be a great 
tribulation close to us. We need to invest new forum of collaboration behind 
a market and bureaucracy also. It is very important to use the sanctions for the 
29 E. Lévinas, Alterity and Transcendence, pp. 147-148.
30 Ibidem, p. 135.
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irresolute people now It is a need of the reason now, of the political and eco-
nomical actions for them, an using of your era of power. Once more the pro-
cess of a responsibility for a power of a state and the church in a new millenni-
um has begun. The church is on the boat of Peter always. But I am never able 
to see the other as she or he really is. The third impel you to think. So, it is nec-
essary, one should, one ought to fight for every inch of Self ’s land, in my self-
imposed exile for this a just cause. I’m only responsible for my own attitude; 
and I have a duty to other people not to lay a downer on them. That’s my own 
choice, I picked that duty up, nobody laid it on me, I chose it for myself – that 
is that I don’t want to lay something on somebody else. We have a choice to 
pick out “duties.” But I’m “responsible” for me. You can’t drink a glass of water 
for me. You can’t eat a sandwich for me. You could cook a beautiful steak and 
put it in front of me, but you can’t eat it for me, is that correct? And you can’t 
go to the bathroom for me. So I’m “responsible” for all that. I’m responsible 
for how I feel. You can’t think for me. You can’t act for me – you can’t do any 
of those things. Now, we pick up duties for other people. That’s a free choice. 
I did it or I did not. I can also lay the “duties” down. Again, it’s a free choice, 
ok? And I don’t choose to keep some “duty” for eternity, that’s my own choice. 
And I was responsible for accepting the duty, nobody laid it on me. I did that 
on my own. “Duty” and “responsibility” are two different things. Duty is what 
you would have for whoever you want to do it, your mother, your friends, or 
both, a job, Life whatever you wanted to. But you can pick it up and lay it down. 
Responsible is what you are for yourself whether you like it or not. There is an 
ethics in which responsibility is seen to precede freedom has been based on 
an exercise of any violence. A tribulation of the world may be overcome by 
a dressing of my own’s wound. So, I am called by your face and you are called 
by mine, I suppose by our lit up and young eyes more and more. I am con-
cerned about my own destiny because I experience it from within as an awe-
somely lovable burden, whereas I experience your destiny as the call that lib-
erates me from being imprisoned in endless self-reflection. My caring for you 
also takes care of my own true self because it promotes me as if I were anoth-
er Other. For this reason I must honor and love the Self in me as much as You, 
because You and I meet in the trace of the Good, which has made us respon-
sible keepers of one anOther.31
31 Cfr. Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak and Emmanuel Levinas, To the Other: An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, Purdue University Series in 
the History of Philosophy, 2005; Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Beyond: The Phi-
losophy of Emmanuel Levinas (SPEP), 1997; Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Ethics 
as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Litera-
ture and Religion, 1995.
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The other is the same as self … So, like masters of the height (or depth), 
speaking in his uniqueness. The other man in this relationship is beyond any 
knowledge He remains absolutely in its otherness The other has to bear as an 
equal among equals The thinkers described the ontological determination of 
this I, they also described that on the interpersonal level as a “way from the 
others to myself.” “The Other is also the face and appearance, the defendant 
and self. Even if you’ve seen the end in Auschwitz, the death of ethics, that is 
no reason, ethics regarded as dead. I still believe in ethics. The crisis of eth-
ics is no reason not to conduct yourself in accordance with ethical. A thinker 
writes: What we are talking about, namely education, civilization, culture, sci-
entific and aesthetic there is a garment spirit of the nation. Why its so different 
colors we see in this or that time, the other in the east, the other in the north, 
the west and the south? Naturally, since each people, strange in the old ages, 
another had a different imagination and poetic inspiration, even the memo-
ry of another past time, another reason in philosophy, at the end of another 
method, or procedures to improve the science and skills. Know but yourself 
is to have the ground beneath himself, and shot inside, Maurycy Mochnacki, 
a writer of Poland said. Then “the people have always lived on hope alone.” 
So, “not quite here, but yet at hand” A thinker said: The Lord did not created 
religion, but the world. Then since it is suffering, God by all possible means 
writes itself. The bible says: At the end of the world would be the great trib-
ulation. Now for that reason we may ask: what is suffering? The most funda-
mental in me is coming uppermost, and the transient, the sensational, is dis-
persing. For it can’t adversely influence what is essential to me. That’s why my 
work is now more powerful and less arbitrary, as if seen by another person, 
and illuminated from outside. In the midst of the confusions of nature one 
person trusting eternally in another, and making himself and the other secure 
through faith. All that’s left now is purely poetic work, putting more life into 
individual places, as I’ve made so sure of the fundamental mood and dimen-
sion of expression that it won’t leave me groping around in uncertainty any 
more. So I used to be too subjective, and I was always tempted to find my in-
ner self in the exterior and dissipate my imagination on other people and on 
life. The great theologian Hans Küng in an interview said: I estimate that what 
convincingly in Jesus inside were overcome, what occurred, survived was that 
he was imposing God’s will the specific direction in understanding the inten-
tion, in the mood, a sense of meaning, the sense of (full) pleasure (and incli-
nations), at such and such way of thinking, in this sense that the will of God 
is truly holy man, and (that) the man also important is as injunctions, but it 
remains true, and that the Sabbath, for example, is the human will, and that it 
is more important-that it depends more on the more-which includes a single 
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man does, as that what believes. Goes also to all the many (powerful) things 
that we know of Jesus, which we learned from him, which we initiated, we re-
member. We are able to do it, for which we are grateful to him. But in princi-
ple this was the so-called, that it is not the knowledge, skills, which leaves us 
that with us end, peel, and relaxes. Not We should keep it very well in prac-
tice: and also by the leadership of the Church should finally once in this way 
(it) be done. As for the statue of Jesus, it should also be every man for her him-
self a little care, it should disturb him. I do not want this in a few seconds fur-
ther developed. To an actual, detailed explanation is not to say we have this 
conversation almost no pop-up time, time present and so there was no time. 
Theologian continued in the same interview: I is (something) recognized as 
legitimate, and it will do. But now trying to convince people. These are the 
things for which intercede, which I designate as, describe because of the ‘glob-
al ethos’ (Weltethos) Here the problem arises because the question of sentence, 
opinions, otherwise (very different) sound, etc. For this (to investigate these 
cases) is required not only political will but also an ethical will, to be able to 
talk about it. I am of the opinion that it is-what-I said here a very, very basic 
need some confidence. Well, precisely because (a) all there is deep respect, es-
teem (Ehrfurcht) with respect to life, you see not kill, “you should not kill”.32
This paper, there is the outcome of several years research supported by 
a tiring and exhausting work. So, we have this idea that we are supposed to be 
responsible and have responsibility within us. And I question myself if I re-
ally know what responsible is. So far I’ve been taught that responsibility is 
when someone does something for you or gives you something or vise versa, 
and when you don’t give them what they want or don’t give … then Respon-
sibility is questioned. For me the responsibility is as while on the way of Love. 
I chose the responsibility. And what’s more I’m serious connate with the eth-
ical now. For I’m not in power I’ve begun to hold in great respect a individ-
ual contribute, state’s contribute also to happiness of mankind and glory of 
a Lord God. I’m of the opinion that there is caring of today. Namely a calling 
to be in own profession. For example the people want to be representative 
themselves on the television and have satisfaction also. So I never cite other 
philosophers as yours. I bear for the person before me an infinite responsi-
bility which is regularly betrayed for the sake of justice in responsibility for 
other people, too. The deeper question is how the court can be founded on 
this betrayal, and how institutions in general can work for the sake of jus-
tice through the use of violence. Looked at in this light, these ideals are not 
32 Cfr. Hans Küng, Why I Am Still a Christian, 2006; H. Küng, My Struggle for 
Freedom: Memoirs (2003), New York-London.
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merely renewed, but also radically deepened. Instead of being a declaration 
of individual freedom, they must now be read as a recognition of responsi-
bility for every other human, a responsibility limited only by the finite nature 
of one’s individual assets. So, without an account of the problem of subjectiv-
ity, it is impossible to construct any adequate and satisfactory theory of con-
sciousness. On the other hand although the thinkers of contemporary argue 
that justice must be globalized … But there is life of yours. A poet says: You 
dropped your whispers: We are never going to die, you fool! T he essence of 
our soul most pure will speak to you. No more the flesh but still providing 
ecstasy. We bards forever never do depart. But why’s your picture withered 
now? Why does your face look pale and grey? There’s sorrow in your tone. 
And slowly, oh so slowly all your words will fade. “We grieve about our art. 
It’s nothing but a shadow. We’ve touched upon the essence but still we grope 
the dark. Go on ahead, you brave man! Search further, further still. Lead us 
down the hall where Stillness rules. That finally our voice may rest. And you 
may rest upon the Timeless. Voices of time once golden! May Stillness be 
your arts transcendence. Find out the longing of your youth. Make ignorance 
look pale. Do not betray the fresh desires of spring. That autumn yield abun-
dant happiness. And fertile be the soil of winter. Somehow life needs other-
ness also. I come to you ´from above´, he ´descends on me´, like God spoke 
from the heights of mount Sinai to his people. My own self is always the ex-
ception (E. Levinas) I may try to picture the other as a self too, but I never 
succeed in doing so. The self of the other always remains enigmatic, escap-
ing all objectification of consciousness. I am never able to see the other as 
she or he really is. This makes my small, relatively familiar `I` the exception 
in a world of silent, hidden and mysterious selves. But it is the most funda-
mental difference between us and Lévinas is the axiom of mine that the oth-
erness of the other is just an illusion. At a fundamental level I and the other 
are the same. We have the same divine ‘substantia’. We all share the same Self 
with a capital. When I look the other in the eye and when the other looks at 
me, we recognize ourselves in our eyes. We love and respect each other, be-
cause we are basically the same. This is not a metaphor meaning ´we are all 
in it together´ or ´we are put up with each other´, no, this is very literally so: 
my deepest `self´ is no different from your deepest `self´. Today we speak to 
ourselves happy new year. Now we look to the future and gather our hopes for 
that. As you know that the North Pole is not where it was two weeks ago and 
the length of our days is different from what it was in the past, not by much, 
but the whole planet changed. Looking back can be difficult, and it helps me 
to remember that, even though we speak of the celebrating of days and hol-
idays, nothing is very ancient right now. We live in a very fresh new world. 
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And we have a long, long way to go. As a human family we have a long way 
to go to become fully responsible for each other.
The problem of the isolation of individuals from communities
One of the major themes of Faulkner’s “Light in August” is the isolation of 
individuals from communities and from one another.33 In the first four chap-
ters of the novel, Faulkner presents four major characters, each of whom is 
separated from society in some important way. Lena Grove, though she re-
lies cheerfully on the kindness of strangers, is morally isolated because of her 
illicit pregnancy and socially isolated because of her constant traveling. The 
sullen Joe Christmas is isolated because of his seemingly mixed racial her-
itage, which causes him to emphasize the differences between himself and 
those around him. Byron Bunch is, like Lena, morally isolated, though by his 
own choice; he makes no friends except Gail Hightower and works almost 
all the time because he is so afraid of how he might spend his time otherwise. 
Hightower himself is isolated as an outcast, rejected by society in his case be-
cause he failed in his appointed task as guardian of public standards, deliv-
ering incoherent sermons while his wife carried on obvious sexual affairs… 
Characters’ interior states, with all their inconsistencies and unspoken moti-
vations, overlap with the generalized voices of the community to create a dy-
namic and realistic portrait of individuals constantly asserting and renegoti-
ating their places in the larger social order… Though the characters search for 
a sense of stability, belonging, and consistency, their inherently fractured na-
tures consistently conspire to thwart these desires… In plumbing the depths 
that exist beneath people’s words – the vulnerabilities, fears, and evasions that 
often do not register in articulated speech Faulkner portrays inherently in-
consistent and self-contradictory nature of identity. People, he argues, in all 
their complexity, cannot be reduced to a simple summation or generalized 
description. What exist instead are warring impulses and an often wide gulf 
between private and public worlds… In telling the backstory of Joe Christ-
mas, Faulkner continues to explore the notion of a fluid, unstable, indeter-
minate identity. Christmas is literally a man without a name… His unknown 
parentage and ambiguous racial heritage condemn him to a life as a shadow 
figure. He is a man who walks on the edges of society, just as he restlessly and 
silently wanders the streets of Jefferson, passing unnoticed through the black 
and white neighborhoods alike, a stranger to both realms and accepted fully 
33 William Faulkner, Light in August, Editor Noel Polk and Joseph Blotner, 1991.
52|
Stanisław Barszczak
by neither. At times mistaken for a foreigner, Christmas is variously tagged 
as being either white or black absolute distinctions that deny his essential 
nature as a biracial man, a person with roots in both worlds… Although 
Faulkner often shows us that competing interpretations and perspectives can 
reveal new truths, we see that they can also result in misunderstandings and 
pave the way for tragic events. When the five-year-old Christmas is caught 
behind a screen in the dietician’s room, a black comedy of misinterpreted 
intentions and mistaken impressions ensues. Faulkner’s authorial eye darts 
forward and backward in time, often presenting a scenario from one char-
acter’s point of view and then revisiting the same incident from an alternate 
perspective… Nameless and mysterious figures the matron, the janitor, the 
dietician (revealed to be named Miss Atkins only at the episode’s end) pop-
ulate a classic setting of childhood deprivation and abuse: the orphanage. 
Ultimately, Faulkner’s portrait of Joe’s formative years serves to complicate 
the moral questions of his tale.
Throughout Light in August, Faulkner explores the importance of mem-
ory amid the various layers of consciousness and thought that contribute to 
an action, motivation, or story. This approach gives us a more dynamic and 
complex understanding of character, gesturing to the parts of an individu-
al that words cannot access or elucidate. For all the thoughts, impulses, and 
articulation that help define a person, there is always an unspoken element, 
the haunting record of the past that can never be expunged. Amid this seem-
ing confusion, memory emerges as a potent and supreme form of knowledge, 
or personal truth. For Joe Christmas, memory consists of a painful personal 
history, an autobiography told not in facts and events but in an ever-present 
and instinctively referenced record of humiliation, abuse, and shame. For Joe, 
memory is a burden that cannot be erased or escaped. With his own life and 
sense of self so emptied and devalued. Yet Faulkner does not seat his char-
acters in a tidy world of moral absolutes, and we cannot label Joe’s upbring-
ing as the sole cause of his vagrancy and criminal activity. Joe himself also 
plays an active role in seeking his own demise and self-destruction…Her ba-
by represents a hope and a boundless possibility that Joe was never able to 
fulfill…He slides further and further from his own existence, crossing over 
a threshold to embrace and embody his bestial associations. Hightower mus-
es that, since being defrocked, he has slowly slipped out of conventional time 
and entered an existence of his own making. He believes that suffering is the 
lot of the wicked and good alike. He also believes that joy and pleasure are 
complicated gifts that most people do not know what to do with… Women 
form a curious, tangential presence in Light in August. The novel resides in 
a male-centered, male-dominated world, exploring masculine brutality and 
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the idea of the Byronic hero (named for the nineteenth-century English poet 
Lord Byron) – a brooding, restless, and flawed individual wounded by life’s 
cruelties and slights. Women exist on the edges of this world, scapegoats for 
the frustrations and unrealized potential of the men in their lives, and often 
the victims of physical brutality… Surprisingly, Hightower, despite his isola-
tion, emerges as the philosophical center of the novel – a humanist presence 
who rejects the rigid moral codes that confine Jefferson’s residents. Hightow-
er’s static, abstract journey to self-knowledge and self-acceptance contrasts 
with the strivings of the other main characters, who either fail to attain in-
sight or fail to act on it. Hightower, Lena, and Christmas all attempt to salvage 
their pride, turn from the harsh realities of the past, and infuse their lives with 
a newfound purpose. They all are damaged individuals whose reputations 
and senses of self have been compromised, both by their own actions and by 
social forces beyond their control. Hightower eventually makes peace with 
his life of internal struggle, stoically embracing his impending death, armed 
with the understanding that suffering is an unavoidable component of exist-
ence… Faulkner equates life with a game of chess, with its various strategies 
and attacks and missteps, all obscuring the fact that these individuals are ul-
timately moving toward a predetermined and inalterable conclusion. In the 
interim, the characters maintain the sustaining illusion that they are the mas-
ters of their own fate, when in fact they are actually pawns being manipulat-
ed by forces larger than themselves and beyond their control… Hightower 
was raised in the presence of these phantoms of the past, his father, moth-
er, grandfather, and the slave woman his grandfather had owned until the 
war. Hightower entered the seminary and later married, intent on being giv-
en a church in Jefferson. It is because a fellow is more afraid of the trouble 
he might have than he ever is of the trouble he’s already got… Memory be-
lieves before knowing remembers. Believes longer than recollects, longer than 
knowing even wonder… I had to do it already in the past tense; I had to do 
it. She said so herself… Perhaps he realized that he could not escape. Any-
way, he stayed… “I mind how I said to you once that there is a price for be-
ing good the same as for being bad; a cost to pay… Maybe it takes longer to 
pay for being good than for being bad.”
Can I be the prodigal son? I want to say something yet. “Once I was the 
only country. Oak there was so high and delicate violets. In it all became 
a dream.” And it is embraced me completely in German, said to me in Ger-
man, now you can see better (unfortunately, almost did not evaluate how well 
it sounded, how wonderfully it sounded), this phrase: “I love you madly”, be-
cause this country the dream was … I still have the love of our mother’s lit-
tle storms, thunderstorms, scattered in the woods by the cataclysm of fallen 
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trees … that’s all. Already it getting used to normal … But what is the future 
of history? History has not stopped with Christ… Paul says that Christ’s suf-
fering is missing something … what? Of Our suffering! Because the suffer-
ing is no longer price, it is priceless, you cannot evaluate them, nor estimate. 
There is no improvement, it is only hope. We have none, to replace shortag-
es of hope. Marta from the Gospel she must tackle the sense of its activity. 
There is a new parable of the child prodigal. Neighbor is the one who needs 
your help now. Good Samaritan from the Gospel, the man who had compas-
sion (hatte Mitleid), was seized with pity (il le vit et fut saisi de pitié). Do this 
and you will live (fais ainsi et tu auras la vie). (We) are the presence of Christ 
among men, even if only through our offering, but as much by how we act … 
(We) have not only some excellent estimates and projections, although these 
are still present. Until 1800, the world needed a million years to the emer-
gence of human to one billion people. Acceleration of civilization is aston-
ishing, this is only after two hundred years, the year two thousand, we were 
already 6 bln. By 2050 it is expected that the world will be 20 percent of Mus-
lims suffering … As each of us turns out to be priceless today already, hence 
it is the huge our hope. So is estimated to assess, for a better tomorrow we 
should take part in the vast resurrection of Christ, and not only in his death, it 
may be participation in the resurrection of Christ and not just his death. This 
finding may be that in the attention and listening peaceful and welcoming… 
Do you know what last summer has meant for me? Constant raptures over 
Emmanuel Lévinas and a whole series of spiritual delights which I’ve never 
experienced before. No student has ever studied so much on his course, and 
learned so much, as I have this last summer. Earlier I have spent many time 
in an emotion and an enthusiasm. Now I want to give these gifts to the peo-
ple away. I want to bestow on them my deepest ‘self ’ and pray that each man 
would find employment based on a natural and a rational joy. We may be in 
own profession. There is precisely today responsibility of mine.
However, it seems that there is still a responsibility only for holiday. Thir-
ty-three years ago I read about the “Adventures” of Lord Jim on the Indian 
Ocean. Joseph Conrad’s novel describes the sinking of the “Patna”. The pas-
sengers are swimming on the ship to Mecca. Surprised is that it was no pan-
ic there. Jim, whom Marlow time after time called romantic, he was char-
acter, and dreamed of a great things at sea, he faced suddenly face to face 
-before the expected disaster of “Patna” – with the absurd situation, that is 
very closed on any of his actions. Jim cannot save of the ship, or any of the 
passengers; he also cannot make a disaster of any sense while remaining 
on the Board. Staying there will be equal to escape because the one and the 
second possibility will constitute the proof of the helplessness, absolutely 
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silent and visible sign decoupling from reality, the hero is so far that he will 
be in some way to form one’s situation. Jim finally exposed asking whether 
it is enough courage; not exposed to any question. The questions is not the 
same as there is no choice: there is only the sudden breaking of the illusion’s 
veil, according to which man is master of his fate and itself. “’I had jumped...’ 
He checked himself, averted his gaze.... ‘It seems,’ he added.” (Lord Jim, chap-
ter 9). Not he himself so much has done that what some instinct in itself has 
chosen for him. Atonement, which the Conrad’s hero imposes himself, aims 
to fix ruptured vesicle image of himself on “Patna”, as an entity having con-
trol over themselves and trustworthy people. Joseph Conrad commentators 
interpret Jim’s elections differently if not very optimistic that this is the story 
of a poor decision and its consequences, but also clear statement about the 
possibility of overcoming the latter. Assume that there is a possibility of re-
demption of the fault, while for Conrad more important than “accusing” (in 
itself, questionable) was the tragic situation of the hero, that the final choice 
of death from the Doramin’ hand the only strengthened this, creating fur-
ther hardship, not defeated or overcame. The final irony of the Narrator is 
pertinent: “Not in the wildest days of his boyish visions could he have seen 
the alluring shape of such an extraordinary success! (Lord Jim, last chapter). 
However, it seems to us constantly, that “such an extraordinary success”, is 
only an effect from the side, due to the lost trust, albeit it may not be any dis-
appointed love of a woman.
Conclusion
The philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas is best known within contemporary 
discourse for his renewal of the question of ethics. He asks us to think about 
experiences in our life which be lie the assumptions of “totality” – of the self 
as complete, as the origin of all knowledge and the justification for all moral-
ity. He then treats these aspects as instances which point towards a new way 
of thinking about what it means to be a human subject, which is not self-ab-
sorbed, but in which our responsibility to another comes before our self-in-
terest. He began to think in the context and the wake of great trauma and vi-
olence. And his purpose is this: to explain it, and explain above all why the 
suffering of others matters to us. Only in a world of infinite responsibility 
would future oppression prove inconceivable. We can kill the other but in 
that very moment they escape their subjection once and for all and haunt 
our dreams forever… the duty of care just happens to you… Lévinas’s work 
is concerned with the very opening of the question of ethical-the ground of 
56|
Stanisław Barszczak
its possibility and impossibility-prior to the production and elaboration of 
all moral codes. Lévinas describes ethics as an interruption of the self ’s habit-
ual complacency that occurs in the encounter with the face of the other. As 
he demonstrates in his main philosophical books, and in numerous impor-
tant essays, consciousness in not reducible to a conciousness of being. Con-
sciousness is radically put into question by the face. Rather than being the re-
sult of any kind of cognition, the self ’s responsibility to the other who faces 
is immediate, originary, and irreducible. We do not and never have existed 
“in and for oneself ”. “Before the neighbour I am summoned and do not just 
appear; from the first I am answering an assignation.” Moreover, it is neither 
the state nor contract that constitutes us, but rather this unique and primary 
responsibility to an other. It is the foundation of our consciousness, our so-
ciety – and our selves… Already the stony core of my substance is dislodged. 
But the responsibility to which I am exposed … does not apprehend me as 
an interchangeable thing, for here no one can be substituted for me … Sub-
jectivity is not one for myself; it is, one more time, initially for the other. To 
say: “here I am”. To do something for an other. To give. It obliges me as some-
one unreplaceable and unique, someone chosen… This responsibility is not 
merely social and expedient but personal and ethical. It is directed not to-
wards the preservation of autonomy, but instead towards the recognition of 
suffering. The combination of these two features provides us with a new way 
of conceiving of the justification of a system of private actions in tort law… 
Responsibility establishes both a sense of self and a sense of relationship, and 
it is these in turn which create the very possibility of agreement, and law, and 
justice. But Lévinas is not satisfied also with love as Eros, he wants to extend 
love to the stranger, to the Other as neighbour and fellow human, which is 
love without concupiscence. For the child is still a being of the Same and the 
Other, while love of the neighbour and fellow human is to accept the abso-
lute alterity of the Other. Every Other is an unfathomable subjectivity which 
represents infinity. Ultimately peace is possible only if we can love the stran-
ger as neighbour and fellow human. a person’s decision is always an inevita-
ble result of their genetic makeup combined with environmental influenc-
es. So if a person decides to commit a crime, this can always be explained as 
a result of past influences. Any individual who had the same genetic make-
up and the same environmental influences would have decided exactly the 
same thing. This is because a person’s decision is always completely caused 
by what happened in the past. The above results have several implications 
for our understanding of moral responsibility. First, not morally responsible – 
level of agreement was assessed to the following questions: in such a world 
it is impossible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions. 
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Second, blameworthy – people should still be morally blamed for commit-
ting crimes; third, If these scientists are right, then it is impossible for people 
to make truly free choices-not free. As for responsibility, our results indicate 
that should neuroscience or philosophy lead the folk to come to think, cor-
rectly or mistakenly, that our minds are mechanistic and our choices are de-
termined, our judgments about moral responsibility will remain largely in-
tact. We should not be deterred from a scientific appreciation of the mind 
by fears of nihilism or social disintegration. So, we should give hospitality to 
the stranger, let them enjoy the rights we enjoy. We have to establish institu-
tions to guarantee justice. For this purpose, we have to employ our knowl-
edge and wisdom. But knowledge and wisdom at the service of love and not 
vice versa. So for Emmanuel Lévinas, love is prior to knowledge and wisdom. 
Though, you make love.
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War, Peace and Love by Emmanuel Lévinas
Abstract
In a world in which everything is reduced “to the play of signs detached from what 
is signified,” Levinas asks a deceptively simple question: Whence, then, comes the 
urge to question injustice? By seeing the demand for justice for the other-the home-
less, the destitute-as a return to morality, Levinas escapes the suspect finality of any 
ideology. Levinas’s question is one starting point for la Proximity. “If it is true that 
we are, through technology, moving closer and closer to one another,” writes some 
editors of the Levinas’s books, then “the importance of proximity and our response 
to it cannot be overstated.” For the author to this article, to which he can contrib-
ute something of significant value, the question of whether we may, ethically, ap-
propriate the object of study for our own causes has become vital. Levinas asks us 
to see ourselves, our own reading, “in proximity” to what is not ourselves, not our 
understanding of the world. “Driven Back to the Text” demonstrates that what is at 
issue here is the Holocaust, and how it drives Levinas back to the Bible, the Kabba-
lah and the Talmud to fight against Hegelianism, totalitarianism and modern pro-
gressivist liberalism. This very return suggests a certain hermeneuticone that both 
brings out of the texts what the readers society needs to hear as well as one found 
in the texts; that is, it is an ethical hermeneutic and is part of the texts ethics. Be-
ginning with a clear introduction to Levinas, the article argues that if, as is accept-
ed, contemporary continental philosophy is heavily influenced by Levinas, and if 
Levinas is heavily influenced by the bible, then contemporary continental philoso-
phy is at least to some extent influenced by christianism.
Keywords: transcendence, meaningful, subjectivity, responsibility, love
